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Abstract 8 
Animal health surveillance is a complex activity that involves multiple stakeholders and provides 9 
decision support across sectors. Despite progress in the design of surveillance systems, some technical 10 
challenges remain, specifically for emerging hazards. Surveillance can also be impacted by political 11 
interests and costly consequences of case reporting, particularly in relation to international trade. 12 
Constraints on surveillance can therefore be of technical, economic and political nature. From an 13 
economic perspective, both surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities that are part of 14 
a mitigation strategy. Surveillance provides information for intervention decisions and thereby helps 15 
to offset negative effects of animal disease and to reduce the decision uncertainty associated with 16 
choices on disease control. It thus creates monetary and non-monetary benefits, both of which may 17 
be challenging to quantify. The technical relationships between surveillance, intervention and loss 18 
avoidance have not been established for most hazards despite being important consideration for 19 
investment decisions. Therefore, surveillance cannot just be maximised to minimise intervention 20 
costs. Economic appraisals of surveillance need to be done on a case by case basis for any hazard 21 
considering both surveillance and intervention performance, the losses avoided and the values 22 
attached to them. This can be achieved by using an evaluation approach which provides a systematic 23 
investigation of the worth or merit of surveillance activities. Evaluation is driven by a specific 24 
evaluation question which for surveillance systems commonly considers effectiveness, efficiency, 25 
implementation and/or compliance issues. More work is needed to provide guidance on the 26 
appropriate selection of evaluation attributes and general good practice in surveillance evaluation. 27 
Due to technical challenges, economic constraints and variable levels of capacity, the implementation 28 
of surveillance systems remains variable. Political and legal issues are also influential. A particular 29 
challenge exists during outbreaks when surveillance needs to be conducted under emergency 30 
conditions. Decision support systems can help make epidemiologically and economically sound 31 
choices among surveillance options. However, contingency planning is advisable so that pre-defined 32 
options allow for rapid decision making.  33 
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1. Introduction: State-of-the art in surveillance 34 
Surveillance has been defined as “the ongoing collection, validation, analysis and interpretation of 35 
health and disease data that are needed to inform key stakeholders in order to permit them to take 36 
action by planning and implementing more effective, evidence-based public health policies and 37 
strategies relevant to the prevention and control of disease or disease outbreaks” (ECDC, 2007).  38 
Although this definition was established for surveillance in the context of public health, it is largely 39 
transferable to veterinary contexts. The information of stakeholders – often referred to as 40 
dissemination – is an essential component of surveillance as it assures that the purpose of collecting 41 
surveillance data is to inform decisions. If the last step is missing, the value of surveillance information 42 
is likely to remain limited. 43 
In animal health, surveillance is applied to a large number of applications. As part of a European-wide 44 
research project, reviews of surveillance activities with different objectives are being conducted. 45 
These include surveillance for emerging diseases (Rodriguez-Prieto et al., 2014), surveillance for 46 
endemic diseases and surveillance for disease freedom. Surveillance provides decision support across 47 
sectors, including government, private industry and individual veterinary practices and their clients. 48 
Surveillance standards for selected hazards are set at both international and national level, most 49 
importantly by the World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) and published in the Terrestrial Animal 50 
Health Code. Such standards are also relevant for international trade decisions and thus have 51 
economic impact. 52 
Some technical challenges in the design of surveillance systems remain. Over the last years, risk-based 53 
surveillance has become popular and progress in its development has been made (Stärk et al., 2006; 54 
Cameron 2012). For some hazards, however, considerable design issues remain. Most notably, the 55 
surveillance for antimicrobial resistance continues to challenge surveillance system design at multiple 56 
levels. First, it is not clear what the unit of analysis should be. We could focus on certain phenotypes 57 
of pathogens which exhibit defined resistance patterns against specific antimicrobials. However, some 58 
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genetic elements are mobile and can be exchanged between bacteria of different species. Thus, EFSA 59 
suggests that the focus should rather be at the gene level (EFSA, 2011). Due to the almost unlimited 60 
number of combinations between host species, bacteria species and antimicrobial substances, priority 61 
setting is a paramount need. Some attempts have been made, but are quickly outdated also due to 62 
the rapid progress in diagnostic possibilities. Next generation sequencing is now much more widely 63 
available and may well become the tool of choice in the near future. However, statistical tools, 64 
sampling frameworks and surveillance designs have yet to adapt to this new situation. And until 65 
international standards will integrate these new methods, even more time – possibly years – will be 66 
needed. 67 
The emergence of Schmallenberg virus in the European Union in 2011 (Afonso et al., 2014) is a good 68 
example to illustrate both strengths and limitations of surveillance systems at present (Roberts et al., 69 
2014). The first signal of the outbreak came from performance recordings on dairy farms. This could 70 
be seen as a successful application of syndromic surveillance, a relatively recent approach to 71 
surveillance where unspecific signals such as performance, body temperature, abortion rates or 72 
mortality are used to trigger investigations at an early stage of an outbreak (Vial & Berezowski, 2014). 73 
In the case of this incident, a previously unknown virus was isolated as part of the investigations and 74 
disease control measures were taken based on a tentative case definition. Using a metagenomics 75 
approach, a novel viral agent was identified (Beer et al., 2013). Emergency risk assessments were 76 
conducted with emphasis on both animal and public health. The development of diagnostic 77 
procedures was very rapid with only 3 months until validation and commercialisation; mass-screening 78 
kits were available within five months. The development of a legal status for Schmallenberg, however, 79 
took longer and remained variable across Europe. While some countries made it notifiable, others did 80 
not. It was highlighted that disease control policy should be such that early reporting of unusual cases 81 
is not penalised (Anonymous, 2012; Beer et al., 2013). 82 
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The Schmallenberg example also illustrates the close links between surveillance and disease control 83 
as described by Häsler et al. (2011). The purpose of surveillance is to provide information for evidence-84 
based disease control decisions. The value of surveillance information remains therefore limited if it 85 
is not considered in a disease management context. Interventions can of course have very different 86 
features and range from extremes such as eliminating animals on affected farms to very minor 87 
measures such as information of farmers to heighten awareness or improve biosecurity. The decision 88 
can of course also be not to initiate any measures, or not yet. As animal health decisions are taken by 89 
different stakeholders, in different contexts and for different reasons, the decision making process is 90 
generally complex and influenced by many factors. Ideally, most relevance would be attributed to 91 
factual information on disease occurrence as produced by surveillance activities and the quality, 92 
feasibility, economics and acceptance of disease management options.  93 
With regards to international trade, if surveillance data demonstrated a favourable health situation, 94 
and if the surveillance was conducted according to international standards or even more demanding 95 
requirements, animals and animal-derived products should be accepted by all markets. Unfortunately, 96 
this is not always how it works out. Other factors such as consumer concerns or protection of the 97 
domestic industry are a political reality. In principle, all countries being member of the World Trade 98 
Organisation (WTO) are subscribing to the principle of free trade. To protect the health of animals, 99 
plants and people, the Sanitary and Phyotsanitary (SPS) Agreement (WTO, 1995) allows for trade 100 
restriction measures to be taken albeit only for a limited period or if based on a formal risk assessment. 101 
A dispute settlement process is in place to address disagreements on trade restrictions. This system is 102 
now well established, and although it appears to be generally working, economic and political factors 103 
do remain active and influential in trade decisions. However, not all countries are member of the WTO, 104 
but the wast majority of major trade partners are. 105 
Constraints on surveillance can therefore be of technical, economic and political nature. Consider two 106 
countries, one with a very effective surveillance in place which duly reports outbreaks at an early 107 
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stage, and another, with limited surveillance and therefore less ability to detect outbreaks. In the 108 
latter, some diseases may go undetected for a long time while trade still continues. This can have wide 109 
reaching consequences in the long run, if losses are higher than if control started earlier. However, 110 
short-term economic interests, fear of loss of reputation and other factors may still provide incentives 111 
for non-reporting. This is also true at the farm level where reporting decisions may be influenced by 112 
compensation as well as the fear of discrimination and stigmatisation. 113 
The aim of this article is to consider technical, economic and political contraints and their impact on 114 
surveillance. We also aim to provide an overview of recent methodological and conceptual 115 
developments indicating progress in the    116 
2. Economics of surveillance  117 
In economic terms, animal production systems exist to provide goods or services to people in society, 118 
such animal source foods, wool, and leather, animals kept as companions, used for sport, work, or 119 
research. However, animal disease reduces the economic benefit people gain from animals, poses a 120 
threat to human health because of foodborne and zoonotic diseases and uses resources that in the 121 
absence of disease could be allocated to alternative purposes and therefore have an opportunity cost. 122 
The economic cost of animal disease is of growing concern given increasing international trade, 123 
changes in production practices fuelled by changes in lifestyle across the world, and changing 124 
environmental conditions. 125 
Both surveillance and intervention are resource-using activities that are part of a mitigation strategy. 126 
Surveillance provides information for response or intervention decisions and thereby helps to offset 127 
negative effects of animal disease. Without relevant data from surveillance programmes, policy 128 
makers would not know if a threat was emerging, if a certain disease was present or if an intervention 129 
was effective. Expected surveillance benefits most often relate to improved disease mitigation, 130 
commonly expressed as avoidance of disease impact including a large variety of monetary and non-131 
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monetary direct and indirect consequences. Examples include the avoidance of human E. coli O157:H7 132 
cases through identification and removal of the pathogen from the beef chain (Elbasha et al., 2000); 133 
the reduction of herds infected with classical swine fever at the time of detection and the related 134 
epidemic costs (Klinkenberg et al., 2005); the increase of  value people assign to recreational fishing 135 
when controlling notifiable fish diseases (Moran and Fofana, 2007); or averting production losses in  136 
animals when controlling bovine virus diarrhoea effectively and efficiently (Häsler et al., 2012). 137 
Surveillance information reduces the decision uncertainty associated with choices on disease 138 
mitigation, and - if effective – adds value by helping to select adequate mitigation measures as 139 
required by the true epidemiological status of a population (Grosbois et al., 2015).  140 
Further, surveillance information contributes to the general body of knowledge of diseases and their 141 
management and can therefore be seen as a long-term investment that will enhance the efficiency of 142 
mitigation in the future. Another major group of benefits stems from the ability of a country to 143 
demonstrate freedom from disease or infection, which facilitates trade in line with the SPS agreement 144 
(WTO, 1995), as the likelihood of importation of the disease is zero. Finally, effective surveillance 145 
produces non-monetary benefits that do not have a market price, but nevertheless have a value, such 146 
as peace of mind, feelings of safety when a hazard is absent, freedom from fear, collaborations and 147 
partnerships resulting in social capital, good reputation nationally and internationally, and consumer 148 
confidence. These non-monetary benefits are directly linked to the surveillance activity; their 149 
valuation can be conducted using economic valuation methods (e.g. contingent valuation).  150 
Surveillance benefits related to improved disease mitigation result from a combination of surveillance 151 
and intervention measures. While surveillance provides information for management decisions, 152 
intervention constitutes the process of implementing measures directed at mitigation. Together 153 
surveillance and intervention achieve disease control and therefore loss avoidance, which constitutes 154 
the final outcome of interest (Howe et al., 2013). In this three variable relationship, surveillance and 155 
intervention can be economic complements or substitutes. Surveillance and intervention resources as 156 
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complements are always used in a given ratio and can be considered to be one input, as for example 157 
seen in a strategy that combines testing (surveillance) and culling (intervention). Surveillance and 158 
intervention as substitutes means that using more of one input requires the use of less resources for 159 
the other; the most prominent example here is early warning surveillance, where timely detection 160 
enables a response at a time when the cumulative incidence and spread (and associated losses) may 161 
not yet be too far advanced and fewer intervention resources are therefore needed to contain the 162 
outbreak (relative to a scenario where disease is detected later).  163 
However, this does not automatically mean that surveillance should always be maximised to minimise 164 
intervention costs. The key consideration is whether the value of outputs consequently recovered is 165 
at least sufficient to cover the additional resource costs and, ideally, the net benefits to society should 166 
be maximised (McInerney et al., 1992). Surveillance and intervention resources for labour, materials 167 
and services are required to design, plan and implement effective mitigation measures; they include 168 
the provision of personnel (e.g. for planning, field and laboratory work, data analysis, communication), 169 
sampling and testing equipment, drugs, vaccines, cleaning and disinfection equipment, and laboratory 170 
services. While many costs vary with the design and intensity of surveillance and intervention, there 171 
are also fixed costs such as available infrastructure (e.g. laboratory and intellectual capacity, trained 172 
personnel). 173 
When surveillance and intervention are economic substitutes, the economic optimum can be 174 
identified by quantifying the technical relationships between loss avoidance and use of surveillance 175 
and intervention resources, translating loss avoidance and resource use into (monetary) values, 176 
determining least cost combinations for surveillance and intervention, and identifying the least cost 177 
combination(s) consistent with the avoidance loss that maximises people’s economic welfare (Howe 178 
et al., 2013). Hence, the value of surveillance information is dependent on the technical efficiency of 179 
surveillance and intervention, the value of losses caused by disease, and the price ratio of mitigation 180 
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resources. The latter means that if we are able to use surveillance in the place of intervention to some 181 
degree (and vice versa), it makes intuitive sense to prefer the cheaper resource.  182 
Because at present, limited empirical data on these relationships are available, economic appraisals 183 
of surveillance systems need to be done on a case by case basis for any disease looking at surveillance 184 
and intervention performance in conjunction, the losses avoided and the values attached to them. In 185 
some instances, these relationships can be simplified, for example in situations where the economic 186 
consequences of an outbreak and the associated response are known to be very large, because it 187 
creates fears in consumers and changes in consumption behaviour or causes high mortality, pain and 188 
discomfort in animals and/or people, or trade bans. Then the analysis may focus on maximising the 189 
technical and economic performance of surveillance keeping the intervention fixed. Such an approach 190 
has for example been applied by Guo et al. (2014) who used technical surveillance performance 191 
parameters in simulations models in combination with a multi-criteria decision-making model to 192 
identify technically and economically efficient surveillance set ups.  193 
Economic efficiency criteria allow weighing and comparing of alternative strategies to come up with 194 
measures that enable the allocation of limited funds to projects in a way that guarantee the best 195 
outcome for society as a whole (Rushton, 2009) and to help understand complex interactions and the 196 
possible effects of a decision. The leading criterion is optimisation, which defines how the net benefit 197 
accruing to society from allocating scarce resources to disease mitigation is maximised. Another 198 
criterion refers to acceptability; it allows to judge whether the benefits stemming from a mitigation 199 
policy at least cover its costs, thus making a strategy justifiable (e.g. seen in cost-benefit analysis or 200 
cost-effectiveness analysis). Finally, the least-cost criterion applies when achieving a technical target 201 
for mitigation without quantification of the benefit is the policy objective. Without systematic 202 
economic analysis, resource allocation and budgeting decisions for animal health rely  on other 203 
considerations, such as technical, political or logistical factors.  204 
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Decision-makers must not only comply with national and international requirements and guidelines, 205 
but also consider what is technically possible in the existing setting (structure and organisation of the 206 
veterinary services and industry), follow political visions and address widespread public scares that 207 
may impact on consumer confidence (e.g. bovine spongiform encephalopathy or avian influenza). 208 
Further, they are expected to consider concerns of livestock holders and base their decisions on 209 
scientific evidence. Thus, the resources invested reflect the value policy makers implicitly attribute to 210 
the mitigation measures willingly paid to protect society from potential negative disease effects. 211 
However, if one accepts that the utility of economic analysis consists in informing decisions, it is 212 
necessary to understand and measure the relationships outlined above. An ex ante economic 213 
appraisal provides important information for resource allocation decisions before the start of a 214 
programme, an interim assessment shows whether the programme is on track and allows 215 
implementing corrective measures, and an ex post analysis allows demonstrating the value realised. 216 
Of course these phases of disease mitigation may not be so clear-cut in reality, but we believe they 217 
help understand the different approaches from an economic perspective. Generally, economic 218 
efficiency in diseases mitigation depends on the effectiveness of disease management. Therefore, 219 
both economic and technical considerations should be included when evaluating surveillance.   220 
3. Evaluation  221 
Evaluation includes a systematic investigation of the worth or merit of a project or programme to 222 
appraise its value or quality (Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1994). It allows 223 
assessing the effectiveness, efficiency and impact of a programme, creating an evidence base, 224 
determining factors that lead to programme success or failure, identifying areas for programme 225 
improvement, and providing justification for funding. As evaluation is a generic approach, each 226 
discipline commonly has its own set of standardised evaluation metrics, approaches and methods that 227 
may be of relevance. For example, evaluation of health information technology looks at clinical 228 
outcomes measures, clinical processes, staff adoption, patient knowledge and attitudes measures, 229 
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workflow and financial impact measures (Cusack and Poon, 2007), while evaluation of nutrition 230 
programmes may consider anthropometric measurements, body mass index, dietary diversity scores 231 
or blood composition (Habicht et al., 2009). Metrics, both qualitative and quantitative, constitute a 232 
reportable and systematic means for examining how a programme is performing and to which extent 233 
desired goals are achieved. 234 
The evaluation of surveillance systems commonly assesses its effectiveness, efficiency, 235 
implementation and/or compliance issues. The specific approach depends on the reasons for 236 
evaluation, the client, the system under consideration, and how activities link to desired outcomes. 237 
Once the evaluation questions are defined, relevant data are collected, analysed, interpreted and 238 
recommendations made and communicated in a way appropriate to the target audience (HSCC, 2004). 239 
Such evaluation can help to identify the strengths and weaknesses of a surveillance system and 240 
provide feedback for continuation of activities with the view of achieving the stated surveillance 241 
objectives. Numerous guidelines are available for the evaluation of surveillance (e.g. HSCC, 2004; 242 
Meynard et al., 2008; Hendrikx et al., 2011; Drewe et al., 2015) including international standards for 243 
human and animal health surveillance systems, respectively, provided by the WHO (2008) and OIE 244 
(2014).  245 
An important aspect of evaluation is that it should be inclusive in terms of the contributing 246 
stakeholders. Ideally, evaluation methods – typically interviews – should include the views and 247 
opinions of all relevant organisations, sectors and individuals that are affected by or benefiting from 248 
surveillance activities. Typically, these will be the providers of information such as farmers, 249 
veterinarians or laboratories, as well as the decision makers, i.e. the “users” of information such as 250 
policy makers, industry or consumers. 251 
Such guidelines offer some consensus in the broad steps to follow (i.e. description of the context and 252 
evaluation process, implementation, and recommendations), but there currently remain gaps 253 
including the lack of detailed implementation guidance, the absence of a comprehensive list of 254 
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attributes to be assessed, and a lack of advice for the selection of attributes and their assessment 255 
(Calba et al., 2015 ). Given the large variability of surveillance contexts, objectives, approaches and 256 
designs, as well as differing interests of policy makers with regards evaluation outcomes,  some degree 257 
of flexibility in evaluation (guidelines) is needed to account for variations in evaluation question, 258 
complexity, evaluation capacity, data and resource availability.  259 
One aspect that is currently neglected or only treated superficially in such guidelines is the economic 260 
evaluation of surveillance. Economics implies the recognition of scarcity and the best possible use of 261 
the disposable resources. It is concerned with choices about the allocation of scarce resources to 262 
satisfy peoples’ needs with the aim to achieve a desired end by minimal use of resources or to 263 
maximise a desired end under the given amount of resources. Consequently, there is always a choice 264 
element attached to economic evaluation. It therefore requires a comparison of alternatives and 265 
assessment of economic efficiency criteria which rely on the consideration of technical and economic 266 
data. This is in stark contrast to performance or operational attributes that describe a surveillance 267 
quality and can be assessed individually.  268 
To make progress in the use of surveillance evaluation, the RISKSUR project (http://www.fp7-269 
risksur.eu/) has developed an integrated theoretical framework and evaluation tool for the technical 270 
and economic evaluation of surveillance. It guides the user through a series of steps and pathways to 271 
help select the right evaluation question, attributes, criteria and methods to evaluate surveillance 272 
systems or components. 273 
4. Challenges in surveillance implementation  274 
It is not only essential to decide for which hazards surveillance should be conducted, but also how to 275 
design and implement surveillance programmes. The design includes all considerations from the legal 276 
basis to the diagnostic test. Implementation may become a challenge when capacity and/or funding 277 
is limited. Providing the legal basis for surveillance may be a political challenge if there is disagreement 278 
13 
 
about where priorities for investments should be set and if responsibilities are unclear. 279 
Implementation of surveillance is particularly challenging if there is an emergency situation around an 280 
outbreak. The following paragraphs discuss such challenges in surveillance. 281 
Surveillance is a key requirement for accessing markets and facilitating trade with animals and animal-282 
derived food. Even if a disease is absent from a country or region, evidence will be required to 283 
document this status. To facilitate the process of determining appropriate intensity and design of 284 
surveillance, the most relevant hazards are covered in the International Animal Health Code published 285 
by the OIE. Partner countries are committed to accepting this standard and to implementing the 286 
policies defined there. If their own requirements go beyond the standard and if operating under WTO 287 
rules, more stringent policies have to be justified. Thus, the rules in relation to international trade are 288 
quite clear. If countries still have a dispute, there is a defined process how this should be addressed. 289 
Countries may also have entered regional trade agreements which may define surveillance and 290 
disease control activities at even more detailed level. In general, standards that focus on the output 291 
of surveillance leave more flexibility for implementation and are therefore preferable. 292 
For hazards that are not relevant to international trade or subject to international requirements, policy 293 
setting is a domestic or industry (i.e. private) affair. This process will involve key stakeholders and – 294 
depending on the country’s current practice – may have more or less government involvement. The 295 
role of government will also depend on the economic relevance of the disease and the importance of 296 
the affected livestock sector. Political processes such as lobbying by interest groups will also influence 297 
whether a disease surveillance or control issue will be put on the agenda. Similarly, ongoing outbreaks, 298 
risk of loss of international reputation, and imminent elections may all impact on whether a hazard 299 
will or will not be of political interest. 300 
Government involvement is typically increased for zoonoses. In this situation, policy development 301 
tends to become more complicated because more than one ministry may be involved (Stärk et al., in 302 
press). Disease mitigation including surveillance and interventions are resource-demanding activities 303 
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and it may not be clear which ministry should pay for what. Data sharing may also be difficult and 304 
slow. Nevertheless, cross-sectoral surveillance may be essential to protect public health. To facilitate 305 
the appraisal of technical processes and their economic relevance for both animal health and public 306 
health, a new framework has been developed for surveillance conducted in a “One health” context 307 
(Babo Martins et al., 2013). This framework allows the economic assessment of surveillance and 308 
intervention across sectors with an explicit allocation of costs and benefits. 309 
Even if policies are agreed and budgets are available, practical implementation of surveillance may 310 
not be straightforward. Capacity may be limited in terms of either personnel or equipment or both, 311 
thus requiring investment into the training of people and into the establishment of facilities and 312 
methods that are required for ongoing surveillance and disease control activities. In some countries, 313 
substantial limitations of such capacities have been identified (e.g. Namatovu et al., 2013). Developing 314 
capacity is often a mid- to long-term goal. But as an added benefit, investments into routine 315 
surveillance activities are likely to also improve preparedness for emerging diseases. Rapid detection 316 
and effective management of emerging diseases require an established level of technical capacity and 317 
general awareness among professionals. This is more likely to be present if surveillance activities are 318 
already implemented for other hazards. This was recently discussed in the context of the Ebola 319 
outbreak in several countries in Africa. The importance of general preparedness and capacity building 320 
has been identified as a key requirement for rapid control.  321 
During an outbreak situation, there may be a serious shortage of capacity at all levels, including 322 
qualified personnel, impacting on both surveillance as well as intervention activities. This was 323 
experienced in an extreme form during the FMD outbreak in the UK in 2003 (Davies, 2002) when 324 
veterinarians had to be sourced from around Europe. Roche et al. (2014) showed that the expected 325 
capacity was influential on effectiveness of a control strategy for FMD and therefore also influential 326 
on the choice of strategy.  327 
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Some benefits are possible during an outbreak if time-consuming tasks can be automated. This 328 
requires investments during peace time into infrastructure (e.g. databases and information systems), 329 
such that location, size and other relevant characteristics of holdings are known. Using such data, it is 330 
possible to provide decision support to staff by using, for example, expert systems for setting 331 
priorities. Models can also be used to investigate possible outbreak scenarios and to estimate the 332 
impact of specific surveillance and interventions (Stärk et al., 1998; Jalvingh et al., 1999; Nielen et al., 333 
1999; Sanson et al., 1999; Harvey et al., 2007; Boklund et al., 2009; Roche et al., 2014a).  334 
While simple decision algorithms for surveillance and outbreak management are relatively easy to 335 
implement, the development of underlying disease models for scenario predictions and assessment 336 
of the impact of surveillance and intervention strategies is much more complex. Comparisons of 337 
different simulation models have shown that they provide technically comparable results, for example 338 
for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) (Dubé et al., 2007, Roche et al., 2014b). But only few such models 339 
have been applied under emergency conditions because they are technically difficult to run and thus 340 
require specialists which may not be available during an outbreak. It may also be too expensive to 341 
maintain such a high level of expertise over years when no outbreaks occur. Finally, modelling results 342 
remain uncertain and may be difficult to communicate. At the moment, such models are therefore 343 
mainly used during peace time to assess the suitability of specific control scenarios. 344 
Not all diseases are as contagious as FMD and require such rigorous surveillance and disease control 345 
activities. Therefore, time is not always the most limiting factor in the implementation of surveillance 346 
activities. Of course any delay in decision making may eventually come at a cost.  347 
A further complication in the management of an outbreak can be the fact that it is a zoonosis and 348 
therefore affects public health. Consumers are sensitive about food risks and can react drastically to 349 
animal-related hazards causing substantial market disruptions and losses to the farming and food 350 
sectors (McDonald et al., 1998; Knowles et al., 2007; Miller & Parent, 2012). Communication therefore 351 
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becomes a critical element. Risk perception is a complex process affected by many factors and 352 
communication requires expertise and needs to be planned carefully (Cope et al., 2010).  353 
5. Conclusions 354 
Surveillance for animal health and food safety hazards is not conducted in isolation but an integrated 355 
component of complex decision making. The economic perspective of surveillance confirms the 356 
intrinsic link between surveillance and intervention. Choices on disease control options are, however, 357 
subject to constraints, not only an economic, but also a political matter. As the analysis of such drivers 358 
is often not easily conducted in an outbreak situation, it is important to assess and learn from 359 
outbreaks with sufficient breadth and depth after they are over (e.g. Taylor, 2003; Hueston, 2013). 360 
Lessons learnt are valuable for general preparedness and also in order to evaluate costs and benefits 361 
of alternative control options. Economic assessments are not yet commonly conducted which is 362 
surprising at a time where resources are limited in any industry. Increased awareness for economic 363 
consequences of decisions and the extent and nature of the achieved benefits (and beneficiaries) are 364 
a pre-requisite for informed decisions. A policy cycle that includes evaluation provides opportunities 365 
for improvements, savings and progress in disease control. Such evaluation should be an inherent part 366 
of any policy and planned systematically, so that the necessary data and information can be collected 367 
to allow for a sound assessment.  368 
  369 
17 
 
References 370 
Anonymous, 2012. New Orthobunyavirus isolated from infected cattle and small livestock – potential 371 
implications for human health. ECDC, RIVM, RKI, 4 pp. [available online 372 
http://ecdc.europa.eu/en/publications/_layouts/forms/Publication_DispForm.aspx?ID=607&Lis373 
t=4f55ad51-4aed-4d32-b960-af70113dbb90 accesses 09/04/2015] 374 
Afonso, A., Cortinas Abrahantes, J., Conraths, F., Veldhuis, A., Elbers, A., Roberts, H., van der Stede, Y., 375 
Meroc, E., Gache, C., Richardson J., 2014. The Schmallenberg epidemic in Europe – 2011-2013. 376 
Prev. Vet. Med. 116, 391-403. doi: 10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.02.012 377 
Babo Martins, S., Rushton, J., Stärk K.D.C., 2013. Economic assessment of surveillance in a One Health 378 
context: a research project on the impact of zoonotic disease surveillance. Proc. MedVetNet 379 
Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, ES04:37 380 
Beer, M., Conraths, F.J., van der Poel, W.H.M., 2013. “Schmallenberg virus”--a novel orthobunyavirus 381 
emerging in Europe. Epidemiol. Infect. 141, 1–8. doi:10.1017/S0950268812002245 382 
Boklund, A., Toft, N., Alban, L., Uttenthal, A., 2009. Comparing the epidemiological and economic 383 
effects of control strategies against classical swine fever in Denmark. Prev. Vet. Med. 90, 180–384 
93. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2009.04.008 385 
Calba, C., Goutard, F., Hoinville, L., Hendrikx, P., Lindberg, A., Saegerman, C., Peyre, M. (2015). 386 
Surveillance systems evaluation: a review of the existing guides. BMC Public Health. 387 
Cameron, A.R., 2012. The consequences of risk-based surveillance: Developing output-based 388 
standards for surveillance to demonstrate freedom from disease. Prev. Vet. Med. 105, 280–6. 389 
doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.01.009 390 
Cope, S., Frewer, L.J., Houghton, J., Rowe, G., Fischer, A.R.H., de Jonge, J., 2010. Consumer perceptions 391 
of best practice in food risk communication and management: Implications for risk analysis 392 
policy. Food Policy 35, 349–357. doi:10.1016/j.foodpol.2010.04.002 393 
Cusack, C.M., Poon, E.G., 2007. Health Information Technology Evaluation Toolkit. AHRQ Publication 394 
No. 08-0005-EF. Prepared for the AHRQ National Resource Center for Health Information 395 
Technology under contract No. 290-04-0016, Rockville, MD: Agency for Healthcare Research 396 
and Quality  397 
Davies, G., 2002. The foot and mouth disease (FMD) epidemic in the United Kingdom 2001. Comp. 398 
Immunol. Microbiol. Infect. Dis. 25, 331–343. doi:10.1016/S0147-9571(02)00030-9 399 
Drewe, J.A., Hoinville, L.J., Cook, A.J., Floyd, T., Gunn, G., Stark, K.D., 2015. SERVAL: A New Framework 400 
for the Evaluation of Animal Health Surveillance. Transboundary and emerging diseases 62, 401 
33-45. 402 
Dubé, C., Stevenson, M.A., Garner, M.G., Sanson, R.L., Corso, B.A., Harvey, N., Griffin, J., Wilesmith, 403 
J.W., Estrada, C., 2007. A comparison of predictions made by three simulation models of foot-404 
and-mouth disease. N. Z. Vet. J. 55, 280–8. doi:10.1080/00480169.2007.36782 405 
18 
 
ECDC, 2007. Surveillance of communicable diseases in the European union – a long-term strategy 406 
2008- 2013. www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/aboutus/Key%20 Documents/08-407 
13_KD_Surveillance_of_CD.pdf. Accessed November 30, 2014. 408 
EFSA, 2011. Scientific Opinion on the public health risks of bacterial strains producing extended-409 
spectrum β-lactamases and/or AmpC β-lactamases in food and food-producing animals. EFSA 410 
Journal 9(8), 2322, 95 pp. doi:10.2903/j.efsa.2011.2322.  www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal. 411 
Accessed online November 30, 2014  www.efsa.europa.eu/efsajournal 412 
Elbasha, E.H., Fitzsimmons, T.D., Meltzer, M.I., 2000. Costs and benefits of a subtype-specific 413 
surveillance system for identifying Escherichia coli O157:H7 outbreaks. Emerg Infect Dis 6, 293-414 
297. 415 
Grosbois, V., Häsler, B., Peyre, M., Thi Hiep, D., Vergne, T., 2015. A rationale to unify measurements 416 
of effectiveness for animal health surveillance. Preventive veterinary medicine. 417 
Guo, X., Claassen, G.D., Oude Lansink, A.G., Saatkamp, H.W., 2014. A conceptual framework for 418 
economic optimization of single hazard surveillance in livestock production chains. Preventive 419 
veterinary medicine 114, 188-200. 420 
Habicht, J.-P., Pelto, G.H., Lapp, J., 2009. Methodologies to evaluate the impact of large scale nutrition 421 
programmes. World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Economic Management. World Bank. 422 
Häsler, B., Howe, K.S., Stärk, K.D.C., 2011. Conceptualising the technical relationship of animal disease 423 
surveillance to intervention and mitigation as a basis for economic analysis. BMC Health Serv. 424 
Res. 11, 225. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-11-225 425 
Häsler, B., Howe, K.S., Presi, P., Stark, K.D., 2012. An economic model to evaluate the mitigation 426 
programme for bovine viral diarrhoea in Switzerland. Preventive veterinary medicine 106, 427 
162-173. 428 
Harvey, N., Reeves, A., Schoenbaum, M.A., Zagmutt-Vergara, F.J., Dubé, C., Hill, A.E., Corso, B.A., 429 
McNab, W.B., Cartwright, C.I., Salman, M.D., 2007. The North American Animal Disease Spread 430 
Model: a simulation model to assist decision making in evaluating animal disease incursions. 431 
Prev. Vet. Med. 82, 176–97. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2007.05.019 432 
Hendrikx, P., Gay, E., Chazel, M., Moutou, F., Danan, C., Richomme, C., Boue, F., Souillard, R., 433 
Gauchard, F., Dufour, B., 2011. OASIS: an assessment tool of epidemiological surveillance 434 
systems in animal health and food safety. Epidemiology and infection 139, 1486-1496. 435 
Howe, K.S., Häsler, B., Stark, K.D., 2013. Economic principles for resource allocation decisions 436 
at national level to mitigate the effects of disease in farm animal populations. 437 
Epidemiology and infection 141, 91-101. 438 
HSCC, 2004. Framework and Tools for Evaluating Health Surveillance Systems.  Health Surveillance 439 
Coordinating Committee (HSCC) Ottawa: Health Canada. 440 
Hueston, W.D., 2013. BSE and variant CJD: Emerging science, public pressure and the vagaries of 441 
policy-making. Prev. Vet. Med. 109, 179–84. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2012.11.023 442 
Jalvingh, A.W., Nielen, M., Maurice, H., Stegeman, A.J., Elbers, A.R.., Dijkhuizen, A.A., 1999. Spatial and 443 
stochastic simulation to evaluate the impact of events and control measures on the 1997–1998 444 
19 
 
classical swine fever epidemic in The Netherlands. Prev. Vet. Med. 42, 271–295. 445 
doi:10.1016/S0167-5877(99)00080-X 446 
Joint Committee on Standards for Educational Evaluation, 1994. The program evaluation standards : 447 
how to assess evaluations of educational programs. Sage Publications Thousand Oaks, Calif.; 448 
London. 449 
Knowles, T., Moody, R., McEachern, M.G., 2007. European food scares and their impact on EU food 450 
policy. Br. Food J. 109, 43–67. doi:10.1108/00070700710718507 451 
Klinkenberg, D., Nielen, M., Mourits, M.C., de Jong, M.C., 2005. The effectiveness of classical swine 452 
fever surveillance programmes in The Netherlands. Preventive veterinary medicine 67, 19-37. 453 
McDonald, S., Roberts, D., 1998. The economy-wide effects of the BSE crisis: A CGE analysis. J. Agric. 454 
Econ. 49, 458–471. 455 
McInerney, J.P., Howe, K.S., Schepers, J.A., 1992. A Framework for the Economic-Analysis of Disease 456 
in Farm Livestock. Preventive veterinary medicine 13, 137-154. 457 
Meynard, J.B., Chaudet, H., Green, A.D., Jefferson, H.L., Texier, G., Webber, D., Dupuy, B., Boutin, J.P., 458 
2008. Proposal of a framework for evaluating military surveillance systems for early detection 459 
of outbreaks on duty areas. BMC public health 8, 146. 460 
Miller, G.Y., Parent, K., 2012. The economic impact of high consequence zoonotic pathogens: Why 461 
preparing for these is a wicked problem. J. Rev. Glob. Econ. 1, 47-61. 462 
Moran, D., Fofana, A., 2007. An economic evaluation of the control of three notifiable fish diseases in 463 
the United Kingdom. Preventive veterinary medicine 80, 193-208. 464 
Nielen, M., Jalvingh, A.W., Meuwissen, M.P.M., Horst, S.H., Dijkhuizen, A.A., 1999. Spatial and 465 
stochastic simulation to evaluate the impact of events and control measures on the 1997-1998 466 
classical swine fever epidemic in The Netherlands. II. Comparison of control strategies. Prev. Vet. 467 
Med. 42, 297–317. 468 
OIE, 2014. OIE Guide to Terrestrial Animal Health surveillance. Office International des Epizooties, 469 
Paris. 470 
Roberts, H.C., Elbers, A.R.W., Conraths, F.J., Holsteg, M., Hoereth-Boentgen, D., Gethmann, J., van 471 
Schaik, G., 2014. Response to an emerging vector-borne disease: Surveillance and preparedness 472 
for Schmallenberg virus. Prev. Vet. Med. 116, 341–9. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.08.020 473 
Roche, S.E., Garner, M.G., Wicks, R.M., East, I.J., de Witte, K., 2014a. How do resources influence 474 
control measures during a simulated outbreak of foot and mouth disease in Australia? Prev. Vet. 475 
Med. 113, 436–46. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2013.12.003 476 
Roche, S.E., Garner, M.G., Sanson, R.L., Cook, C., Birch, C., Backer, J.A., Dube, C., Patyk, K.A., Stevenson, 477 
M.A., Yu, Z.D., Rawdon, T.G., Gauntlett, F., 2014b. Evaluating vaccination strategies to control 478 
foot-and-mouth disease: a model comparison study. Epidemiol. Infect. 1–20. 479 
doi:10.1017/S0950268814001927 480 
20 
 
Rodriguez-Prieto, V., Vicente-Rubiano, M., Sanchez-Matamoros, A., Rubio-Guerri, C., Melero, M., 481 
Martinez-Lopez, B., Martinez-Aviles, M., Hoinville, L., Vergne, T., Comin, A., Schauer, B., Dorea, 482 
F., Pfeiffer, D.U., Sanchez-Vizcaino, J.M., 2014. Systematic review of surveillance systems and 483 
methods for early detection of exotic, new and re-emerging diseases in animal populations. 484 
Epidemiol. Infect. 1–25. doi:10.1017/S095026881400212X 485 
Rushton, J., 2009. The Economics of Animal Health and Production. CAB International Wallingford. 486 
Stärk, K.D.C., 2012. Evaluating surveillance programmes: ensuring value for money. Vet. Rec. 171, 421-487 
2 doi: 10.1136/vr.e7124 488 
Stärk, K.D.C., Regula, G., Hernandez, J., Knopf, L., Fuchs, K., Morris, R.S., Davies, P., 2006. Concepts for 489 
risk-based surveillance in the field of veterinary medicine and veterinary public health: review of 490 
current approaches. BMC Health Serv. Res. 6, 20. doi:10.1186/1472-6963-6-20 491 
Stärk, K.D.C., Arroyo Kuribreña, M., Dauphin, G., Vokaty, S., Ward, M.P., Wieland, B., Lindberg, A., in 492 
press. One Health Surveillance ‒ more than a buzz word? Prev. Vet. Med. 493 
Taylor, I., 2003. Policy on the hoof: the handling of the foot and mouth disease outbreak in the UK 494 
2001. Policy Polit. 31, 535–546. doi:10.1332/030557303322439399 495 
Vial, F., Berezowski, J., 2014. A practical approach to designing syndromic surveillance systems for 496 
livestock and poultry. Prev. Vet. Med. doi:10.1016/j.prevetmed.2014.11.015 497 
WHO, 2008. International Health Regulations.  WHO, Geneva. 498 
WTO, 1995. The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS 499 
Agreement). World Trade Organisation, Geneva. 500 
 501 
